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Abstract: Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, many countries including Australia and Malaysia
have been able to justify the use biometric devices such as fingerprint scans, retina scans and facial recognition for identi-
fication and surveillance of its citizens and others in the name of national security. In addition, biometric devices are in-
creasingly being used worldwide by organizations to keep track of their employees and their productivity, leading to concerns
of privacy, the safety, reliability, abuse and misuse of the data collected and violations of civil liberties. Taking the critical
theory perspective, this paper will analyse the data collected and report on the findings of a survey carried out in Australia
and Malaysia, with respect to the responses provided and opinions expressed to the survey’s open ended and other questions
by individuals as to their current use, experiences, preferences, concerns about the devices and the situations in which they
think biometric devices should be used, including in their workplaces. This descriptive study uses both quantitative and
qualitative data to examine what Australians andMalaysians think about the use of biometric devices in everyday situations
and compare them as to their similarities and differences. The paper will then critically examine the ethical and civil
liberties issues involved in the use of biometric devices in everyday life and argues that regulatory and legal measures
should be taken to safeguard the rights of citizens while maintaining national security and productivity, in order to avoid
the situation of Michel Foucault’s Panopticon becoming an unpleasant everyday reality, which could negatively influence
social justice and create social change due to its effects on individuals in two multicultural societies. The paper will argue
about the need to educate the general public as to the issues of surveillance and privacy involved in the use of biometric
devices in everyday situations.
Keywords: Biometric Devices, Biometric Identifiers, Electronic Surveillance, New Technologies and Privacy, Australia,
Malaysia.
Introduction
IN JULY 2004, ‘The Age’ newspaper publishedinMelbourne, Australia, reported an ethical andprivacy violation involving the data collected
via the practice of obtaining blood samples of
newborns in hospitals in the state of Victoria in
Australia since 1965 and of all babies born in the
state since 1970 (Noble, 2004). It reported that the
organization in charge of the database had changed
ownership several times over that period and the
database with information on about 2 million sub-
jects, was now held by a not-for–profit company
with an active commercial focus, resulting in the
data not being under the control of the state parlia-
ment. The information stored in this database could
be obtained by police with a court order and the cards
carrying the blood samples and other information of
1000 individuals from this database have already
been given to researchers without any consent sought
or obtained for making the data available to others
or with the knowledge of the parents of the children
or the individuals concerned.
The blood samples are collected as a means of
testing for congenital disorders and are required to
be held until the child turns two years of age, at
which stage, the parents of the child are entitled to
ask for the card as it is no longer required for the
medical purposes they were intended for. However,
very few parents of these babies or the adult individu-
als whose information is stored in the database, are
aware of this right, know where these cards may be
stored or who they should ask, if or when they want
to get the cards back. The newspaper reported that
the Victorian State government authorities were in
the process of enacting legislation to safeguard this
database from future abuses or misuses that could
violate the principles of informed consent, voluntary
participation (in later research using the data), pri-
vacy and civil liberties of the subjects that could
cause them harm, according to standard ethical
guidelines related to scientific research (Baxter &
Babbie, 2004).
Rationale for Study
The above phenomenon known as ‘function creep’
(Economist, 2000) where data collected for one
purpose is used for another without those who
provided the data being aware of it, indicates the
need for legal and other safeguards to be in place to
protect databases carrying information on humans
from beingmisused and abused, and thereby leading
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to violations of individual rights to privacy and civil
liberties at a later time in unexpected ways. This need
has become more urgent since the increased use of
biometrics as identifiers of individuals by govern-
ments worldwide, in the name of national security
and international terrorism prevention since the
September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City, with
little public debate or scrutiny and adequate legal
safeguards or guidelines. Therefore, it is important
to educate the public as to what biometrics are, what
they can be used for, both the positives and the neg-
atives of biometric technologies and the need for
legal and other safeguards to guarantee the security
of these databases and their potential abuses and
misuses. This would help ensure citizens are ad-
equately informed when allowing their governments
to impose the compulsory use of biometric technolo-
gies in their everyday life.
Biometric Devices
According to the Association for Biometrics (UK),
‘biometric devices are used for the automated identi-
fication or verification of human identity through
the measurement of repeatable physiological and
behavioural characteristics’ (cited in Kochan, 2004;
125). The most commonly used biometrics (to
measure characteristics of a living thing) in identity
verification instead of passwords, that are based on
a person’s physiological characteristics are facial
features, the vein pattern in the retina via retina scans,
iris scans, finger prints, hand shape, palm prints, and
the vein patterns on hands. Behavioural biometrics
that can be similarly used are handwriting (eg. signa-
tures), voice analysis, signature dynamics, movement
gaits and keyboard typing rhythms (Smith, 2003;
Lockie, 2002; Moody, 2004). Since the September
11, 2001 events, many nations including Australia,
Malaysia and the USA, have drastically increased
the use of biometrics for identity verification (to
check if a person is who s/he says s/he is) and surveil-
lance of their citizens and others for purposes of na-
tional security (Weerakkody, 2004; Kristoff, 2004;
Clarke, 2001; van der Plogg, 2003).
Advantages of Using Biometric Devices
Mark Lockie (2002) traces the history of using bio-
metrics for identity verification to 2600 BC where
ancient Egyptians used body measurements to
identify workers building the Great Pyramids (p. 58).
In 1960, the first true biometric system was de-
veloped and released by the Miller Bothers in New
Jersey, USA in the form of a mechanical device that
automaticallymeasured the length of people’s fingers
(Lockie, 2002; 59). Over time, the costs related to
biometric devices have been reduced making them
more affordable to be used in everyday situations.
Swipe cards or Personal Identification Numbers
(PIN) require a person to ‘own’ or ‘know’ something
(Lockie, 2002), which can be easily left behind or
forgotten. Many IT help desk calls are about forgot-
ten passwords or PINS, which cost an organisation
between $50-100 each (Moody, 2004). In contrast,
a biometric is something a person ‘is’ such as a finger
scan (Lockie, 2002; 11). They are most useful for
providing restricted access to authorised individuals
working in high security areas and for protecting
confidential records or databases- such as in hospit-
als, from unauthorized access. They have also been
useful is crime detection where 19 wanted criminals
were identified with face scans at a stadium in
Tampa, FL during the Super Bowl in 2001. The
Sydney Olympics in 2000 had some parts of the
athletes’ village secured with biometric identifiers
required for access (Lockie, 2002).
As biometric characteristics are unique to an indi-
vidual, they can be assumed as highly reliable. Some
biometrics can be used to differentiate between
identical twins while some do not change across time
for the same person. Biometric devices are more ef-
ficient and convenient to use in comparison to other
methods of identity verification.
Disadvantages of Biometrics
The main disadvantage of biometric technology is
that 4-10% of the population will not be able to
provide a given biometric. Eg. The blind for iris
scans or those without hands for finger prints. Finger-
prints can also be harder to read in females, Asians
andmanual workers. If a biometric record of a person
is intercepted while being passed through a network
or stolen from a smart card, unlike passwords or
PINs, a new one cannot be issued. With the current
level of vulnerability of networked security systems
related to web browsers, servers and operating sys-
tems (Noguchi, 2004), and the use of traditional
methods of forgery such as using Silicon films to
forge finger prints, biometrics have proven to be
fallible, contrary to popular beliefs and official
claims (Economist, 2000). There is also a well known
case of the Oregonman (who had recently converted
to Islam), who was wrongly arrested on suspicion
for the Madrid bombings in 2004, which indicates
that the system is not fool proof. A person falsely
accused of a crime based on biometric evidence, will
find it hard to prove their innocence, as they are
generally perceived as infallible.
The strongest argument against the use of biomet-
rics is that they can be misused and abused by law
enforcement and state authorities to keep citizens
and others such as refugees, illegal immigrants and
other marginalised or ‘suspect’ groups and individu-
als under surveillance and oppression, which can
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lead to violations of privacy and civil liberties (Eco-
nomist, 2000).
Current Use of Biometrics in Australia
All new passports issued in Australia since July 2004,
carry a computer chip with the holder’s facial image.
These ePassports are a result of the US government’s
requirement that citizens of countries with Visa
waiver status to visit the USA (for a period less than
90 days) to be issued only biometric passports after
October 26, 2005. These ePassports will be used in
conjunction with the SmartGate facial recognition
technology currently being trialled at Sydney airport.
The SmartGate will scan a person’s face and compare
it with their ePassport photo and the gate will open
for the person only if the two images match (Russell,
2004). Iris scans have been used for Qantas cabin
crews on international flights at the Sydney airport,
since long before the September 11, 2001 events.
The Australian Immigration Department plans to
finger print suspected illegal immigrants (without
consent if necessary) and given 28 days to confirm
their identity (Hudson, 2005), before being sent for
mandatory detention until their cases are heard. Even
though touted as reducing the risk of legal residents
being wrongly arrested as illegal, as seen in the
highly publicised case of Cornelia Rau- a former
Qantas flight attendant and mentally ill permanent
resident, who was wrongly held in detention for
months, this measure allows the Australian govern-
ment to provide information related to these illegal
immigrants to other governments, particularly of
those who fail in their visa applications to remain in
Australia (SBS Online, 2003).
Current Use of Biometrics in Malaysia
Malaysia is the first country to issue biometric-en-
abled passports and currently several million of them
are in use (Kochan, 2004). TheMalaysian newspaper
‘Utusan Malaysia’ (2005) reports on a decision of
the Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Ba-
davi to use biometrics for recruitment of Indonesian
workers in Malaysia. Fingerprinting is to be intro-
duced in a bid to combat the problem of 1 million
Indonesian illegal immigrants inMalaysia, who come
in search of work.
Malaysia also intends to issue all its citizens –
teens and older, with a biometric ID card known as
MyKad, that carries their fingerprint as a biometric
in a computer chip. This card is to be used as a bank
card, identity document, driver’s license, commuting
pass, and will be later extended to voting and inter-
national travel (McGinty, 2005).
Theoretical Framework
This paper takes the critical perspective in examining
the adoption of a new communication technology
for both its advantages and disadvantages so that
optimal uses can be made of it while keeping check
of its abuses, misuses and negative effects. It will
examine the potential of the technology and the data
collected, to allow authorities and employers in
democracies to keep their citizens, employees and
others under surveillance which could adversely af-
fect their civil liberties and privacy.
In the 1960s, the practice of computerized data
collection and storage by state authorities and com-
mercial organizations gave rise to fears of George
Orwell’s ‘1984’ (Orwell, 1949) and ‘Big Brother’
governments (and corporations) keeping track of
citizens, employees and consumers with analogies
toMichel Foucault’s (1977) ‘Panopticon’ or ‘Panop-
tic surveillance’. Social theorists used the concept
of the Panopticon with its ‘Wheel Configuration’ to
‘understand these emerging informational practices’
(Phillips, 2004; 695).
Biometrics support the accumulation and central-
ization of knowledge and information and ‘allow for
individuals to be observed and acted upon as indi-
viduals, but understood as a collective’ with all
knowledge concentrated with the central observer,
who can then use this knowledge for creating ‘pro-
files’ of various groups. Based on these profiles, in-
dividuals and groups can be bestowed with punish-
ments or gratifications based on how they fit the
‘norm’ set by the central observer (Foucault, 1977
cited in Phillips, 2004; 695). The political economy
perspective sees this situation as serving the needs
of capital (Gandy, 1993) such as when applied to
organizations with employers keeping their employ-
ees under surveillance. This view is supported by
the increasing use of biometrics and other technolo-
gies of surveillance by employers (Robinson, 2004)
to keep track of work hours even of salaried workers
to monitor their productivity (Maher, 2003 cited in
Moody, 2004).
Hirschheim (1985) describes the three views re-
lated to the social impact of new technologies as
optimistic (which takes an utopian view of techno-
logy being all positive and advocated by theorists
such as Marshall McLuhan, 1969) ), pessimistic
(where technologies are seen as increasing the power
and control of those in authority as discussed in Be-
niger, 1986), which can lead to abuses and misuses,
and pluralist (where technologies can be seen as
neutral per se but how they are used depends on the
desires and wishes of the designers and controllers
of the technology and lead to either positive or neg-
ative outcomes based on their use (Burns, 1981).
This paper takes the pluralist view of technology.
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Literature Review
Biometric devices can automatically verify a person’s
identity based on their unique physiological or beha-
vioural characteristics, by comparing the character-
istic with those of others in a database to find amatch
(Lockie 2002). In spite of being useful in forensic
examinations to verify the identity of a person by
matching samples, DNA, even though unique to each
person, is not a biometric, as it is not yet fully auto-
mated.
Biometrics can give rise to two types of errors
–namely false acceptance (accepting an imposter)
and false reject (refusing a genuine person). It is also
harder for biometrics to ‘identify a person’ (answer
the question ‘Who is this?’) and is generally more
suited for verifying a person’s identity (Lockie,
2002).
Yuki Noguchi (2004) describes how easy it is for
anyone using Google searches to obtain many types
of information such as lists of suspected Taliban or
Al-Qaeda members and their details, access random
medical records, bank account numbers, student
grades, docking records of US Navy ships, submar-
ines and destroyers etc. legally, by simply using the
powerful search engine, due to many businesses and
government agencies using it to transmit and store
information. This raises concerns about the safety
and confidentiality of any databases of information
obtained as biometrics by governments and corpora-
tions worldwide, if each of the servers where this
information is stored is linked to the Internet. The
factors responsible for the ease in which outsiders
can access such confidential information is due to
improperly configured servers, weaknesses in the
security systems and human error, which can make
such information accessible to those not meant to
have that access. Once Google or another search en-
gine locates such information or databases, it is al-
most impossible to reverse the process.
Irma van der Plogg (2003) discusses how the in-
creased surveillance needs of society have led to the
spread of biometrics as a security solution. She points
out that the two opposing lines of argument for their
use are whether they are a threat to privacy or not.
She examines the deterministic and voluntarist con-
structions of the technology as rhetorical devices and
as discursive strategies which serve their own pur-
poses in the political process of shaping biometric
technologies. This argument can be illustrated by
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s introduction of
fingerprinting as a requirement for all visa applica-
tions for the United Kingdom as a practical and sys-
tematic response to problems related to asylum and
illegal immigration. However, the opposition Conser-
vative Party had described this measure as ‘headline
grabbing in time for the May (2005) election (SBS
World News, 2005). Malaysian Prime Minister
Ahmad Badavi’s decision to fingerprint illegal im-
migrants from Indonesia (Utusan Malaysis, 2005)
too can be seen as politically motivated within the
context of Malaysians’ increasing fears of and con-
cerns about rising crime rates in the country, per-
ceived as caused by these immigrants.
The US government’s passing of the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry ReformAct of 2002,
which requires everyone entering the US after Oct.
26, 2004 (later extended to Oct. 26, 2005) to have
biometric identification on travel documents
(Grossman, 2003), has resulted in many other coun-
tries being compelled to adopt the technology, sup-
porting the pessimistic view of technology that a
technology can increase the power and authority of
powerful nations and of all governments over their
citizens and others. It also supports van der Plogg’s
(2003) argument that certain purposes in the political
process can shape biometric technologies.
David (2004) argues that biometric ID systems
can only work with improved intelligence related to
international terrorism. He sees the need for an im-
proved profiling system, improved ‘no fly’ and
‘automatic selectee’ lists and improved sharing of
information between various intelligence agencies
(worldwide). The technologies used in different
countries should also be interoperable or compatible
with each other to use, if the new biometric passports
etc are to be effective.
Kochan (2004) points out that for a successful
application of biometric technology, it is necessary
to use the correct biometric for each purpose as the
various biometrics have both strengths and weak-
nesses. A fall back process is needed to accommodate
those who cannot provide a given biometric such as
the blinds’ inability to provide an iris scan. The
support of the users of a given biometric and its im-
plementation is also necessary, in order to avoid
sabotage, and the improper or inaccurate use of the
technology. In addition, the technology should be
convenient to use and be secured against identity
theft, aspects that are important to users of the sys-
tems.
Addressing the pessimistic view, Wadman (1999)
sees how privacy advocates fear biometric systems
can be abused by government and industry. Industry
or an authoritarian state could use biometrics as an
all purpose identifier (as proposed in Malaysia) that
could be then used to ‘deny benefits, restrict travel
or even obliterate the individual as a state-recognised
entity’ ( www.nature.com ). Biometrics can identify
a person in one area, which can then be used to ad-
versely affect that person in another area such as for
social security, police etc. (Simon Davis – Director,
Privacy International cited in Wadman, 1999).
However, the International Biometric Industry
Association (IBIA) argues that the technology is safe,
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user-friendly and near perfect in terms of protection
against identity theft and privacy abuses (Wadman,
1999). John Siedlarz – the Vice Chairman of IBIA
and Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of
New Jersey–based Iriscan considers biometrics as a
tool for protecting privacy as it is more secure than
PINs or passwords for computers and thereby en-
hanced in data security as only those authorised can
access confidential records (Cited inWadman, 1999).
The IBIA believes that biometric data must not be
released without personal consent or authority of law
(Wadman, 1999). How data is collected, stored, ac-
cessed and used should be based on clearly defined
policies and the data distribution should be reserved
for their original purpose. How government agencies
can acquire and use biometric data should be accord-
ing to ‘clear legal standards’. Both private and public
sectors should adopt suitablemanagerial and technic-
al controls to protect databases containing biometrics
(Wadman, 1999). The Economist (2000) cites the
IBIA policy that insists governments’ use of biomet-
rics to be strictly regulated and that transparency
should be required of private companies that use
biometrics. However, the Patriot Act implemented
after September 11, 2001 in the USA, has completely
overshadowed any other concerns on issues of pri-
vacy and surveillance related to biometrics or any
other measures, as national security and border con-
trol and their corresponding discourses have domin-
ated over civil liberties and individual rights. It has
also changed biometrics from a niche technology to
that of an ubiquitous one, within the space of a few
years.
Methodology
This study used surveys returned by 230 individuals
in Australia and 408 individuals in Malaysia, who
were a part of a convenience sample selected via the
researchers’ personal contacts and their acquaint-
ances. The survey asked people what they think of
the use of biometric devices in everyday life such as
at Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs), logging into
Personal Computers, buying products online, in
schools to protect children, tracking employee work
hours, security related to air travel, use by doctors
and hospitals to guard patient records and maintain-
ing security at stadiums and other public places.
It also asked respondents what they think about
biometric devices and their efficiency (eg. Fast and
more convenient; use of finger prints as unsanitary)
and collected their responses on a 5 -point Likert
scale (Baxter & Babbie, 2004; 170) that ranged from
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.
The survey also examined the respondents’ prefer-
ences for using various biometric devices such as
finger print scans, iris scans, retina scans, voice re-
cognition and handwriting recognition when logging
onto their computers, using the ATM or cashing a
check, and gaining access to their offices. It then
asked them what biometric devices of the afore-
mentioned five preferences, would make theme feel
uncomfortable or reluctant to use.
However, this paper reports only on the open-
ended questions posed in the survey about how the
respondents currently use biometric devices, what
their concerns about them are, and in what situations
they think it is acceptable to use them.
The demographic details of the respondents as to
their age group (10-20 years, 21-30, 31-50, 51+),
sex, and level of education (some high school, com-
pleted high school, some university or technical
college, university degree, and post graduate) were
also collected.
Efforts were made to select respondents to fit a
stratified sample of the population (eg. 50% of total
respondents to be male and 50% female and 25%
each to come from each of the four age groups listed
in the survey etc.) (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). Based
on this breakdown, the author used convenience
samples of suitable individuals within these groups
drawing on respondents from those among and with
the help of one’s acquaintances in Australia. The
Malaysian data was collected by an associate of the
author in Malaysia from those among and with the
help of the associate’s acquaintances, using the same
guidelines whenever possible.
Findings
The survey responses were coded and examined us-
ing the Statistical package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS 12.0) to provide a descriptive analysis of the
data collected from the three open ended questions
in the survey to discuss what the respondents knew
about their current use of biometric devices in
everyday life; their concerns about such devices and
what they think how biometric devices should be
used. The responses to the open ended questions
were coded under various themes that evolved from
the responses themselves and were labelled to illus-
trate the main arguments embedded in each theme.
A preliminary data analysis of 75 surveys from
Australia, were examined in Weerakkody (2004).
Some of the discussions and conclusions made from
that analysis were found to be applicable to this
comparative analysis as well and have been included
in this paper.
Current use of Biometric Devices
In the Australian sample, 45.1% or 103 of 230 re-
spondents and in the Malaysian sample 44.8% or
184 of 408 respondents did not respond to this
question. Of those who did, 77.1% or 98 in Australia
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and 56.25 % or 126 in Malaysia reported that they
currently did not use them. For Australian respond-
ents who answered this question, the most used bio-
metric was handwriting for banking (4 or 3.1%), for
passports (3 or 2.3%), voice for mobile phone, for
ID purposes, and at airports (2 or 1.5%). For those
Malaysians who responded to this question, the most
used was handwriting for banking (40 or 17.85%),
for ID purposes (16 or 7.1%), and passports (4 or
1.8%).
Concerns about Biometric Devices
The ‘no response’ rates for this question for Australia
were 56 or 24.3% and for Malaysia, it was 135 or
33.1%. Of those responded, 22 or 12.6% in Australia
and 22 or 6.9% in Malaysia indicated that they were
not concerned about the use of biometrics. However,
48 respondents or 17.6% in Malaysia indicated they
support the use of biometrics while no Australians
respondents did so.
For Australian respondents who answered the
question, the main categories of concerns were Inva-
sion of privacy (35 or 20.1%); Reliability of the
technology (i. e. system breakdowns) (16 or 9.2%);
Physical side effects to the body and surveillance
(13 or 7.5% each); misuse/abuse of data collected
(11or 6.3%); and inconvenience (10 or 5.7%). For
Malaysians who responded, the top categories were
misuse/abuse of data (25 or 9.15%); Safety (posit-
ively involved in using biometrics) (23 or 8.4%);
Reliability of the technology- again positively (21
or 7.7%); negative physical side effects (18 or 6.6%);
Invasion of privacy (16 or 5.9%); and hygiene issues
(1 or 3.7%).
Two (or 1.1%) of the Australians who responded
indicated civil liberties as a concern while no one
indicated the technology as increasing safety. Among
the Malaysians, only 2 (or 0.73%) indicated surveil-
lance as a concern and no one mentioned civil liber-
ties.
A few respondents in both countries feared being
forced by criminals to provide their biometric identi-
fications to access restricted areas by cutting fingers
or eyes for the purpose etc. (They may have learnt
this from movies such as ‘Demolition Man’ and in-
ternalized it without attributing it to the media). A
few actually mentioned movies such as ‘Gattaca’
(1997), ‘Minority Report’ (2002) and ‘Charlie’s
Angels’ (2000 & 2003), without providing a specific
context to their comments.
Reliability / Accuracy/Efficiency/
Inconvenience Involved in Using
Biometrics
Some respondents were concerned about the costs
of the systems, which could be passed on to the
public; glitches of the systems; the systems being
too complicated; having room for error; time consum-
ing; and questioned if biometrics would be anymore
effective than other technologies used for identity
verification.
Pessimistic Views of Technology
Under this category, respondents expressed fears of
government controls; violation of civil liberties; be-
ing used for monitoring of staff instead of for secur-
ity; creating a culture of fear, mistrust and authorit-
arian control; leading to excessive use, paranoia and
‘1984’; used in situations where it is not needed;
taking biology as a means of truth; leading to global
conspiracy; and that they may be socially unneces-
sary.
Practical Concerns
Some respondents thought biometric devices will be
unnecessarily restrictive where one can’t lend one’s
bank card to their partner or log on to others’ com-
puters and that they may inhibit freedom of move-
ment.
Exclusion of Some Individuals
SixMalaysians and two Australians were concerned
about those who may be unable to provide a biomet-
ric for identification such as due to amputations,
having fingers in casts etc.
When Should Biometric Devices be Used
Among those surveyed, 37.0% or 85 in Australia and
107 or 26.2% in Malaysia did not answer this ques-
tion. Of those who did, the main uses suggested by
Australians were for security without infringing on
personal liberties (23 or 15.9%); Banking and related
activities (20 or 13.8%); Air travel (17 or 11.7%);
in high security situations (15 or 10.3%); and for
accessing personal records (11 or 7.6).
For theMalaysians respondents, the highest ranked
uses suggested were Banking/credit card and related
activities (77 or 25.6%); for security without
impinging on personal liberties (69 or 22.9%); to
protect personal records (28 or 9.3%; to improve
public safety (14 or 4.7%); detect crime (12 or 4.0%);
and in high security situations (9 or 3.0%).
A few Australian respondents stated that ‘we
should not use them, don’t need them, they need to
be investigated more’ or questioned if they are ‘any
better than other methods’, while no Malaysian re-
spondents indicated same.
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Discussion
Many respondents had indicated to the researcher
and to her associates who helped distribute the sur-
veys that they had not knownwhat biometric devices
were, until they read the definition in the survey even
though a good percentage of the respondents were
higher educated. Many also had not provided re-
sponses to the open ended questions.
Australians are well known for traveling overseas
and will be faced with biometrics at airports and in
their passports.Malaysians already use them in larger
numbers and had been for some time. They are also
very likely to be issued with the MyKad in the fore-
seeable future (McGinty, 2005), which will be used
for multiple purposes and linked to several databases,
making it easy for surveillance and access by many
institutions. Once biometrics become widely used,
it will be hard to refuse to or not be part of them.
Biometric devices are seen as tools that can limit our
freedoms and repress ‘different thinkers’, public in-
terest advocates and other ‘trouble makers’ and dis-
senters (Clarke, 2001). Their use has the potential to
create a situation where ‘technological imperatives’
will override those of democracy (Safire, 2004).
In modern times, they can be a necessary evil as
the ‘right to life’ (from terrorism) will be more im-
portant than possible violations of individual privacy,
civil liberties and freedoms, as already experienced
with the US Patriot Act. However, asWilliam Safire
(2004) argues, the right to stay alive, needs to be
balanced with the right to be left alone post
September 11.
The findings show that even if most respondents
see the positives as well as negatives of biometric
devices and their potential to violate privacy, for
abuse and misuse of data, be harmful to their health
or body and be unreliable and inconvenient to use,
no one appears to indicate that legal safeguards
should be in place to protect individual rights, in the
open ended questions which asks them how biomet-
rics should be used. In such an environment, it will
be very easy for authorities in Australia or elsewhere
to pass laws or introduce procedures regarding bio-
metric devices that will violate civil liberties and in-
dividual privacy, without any accompanying legal
or administrative safeguards and guidelines.
Australia has a record of law enforcement organ-
izations using phone taps as the easy way out for
crime detection, resulting in misuse of powers and
violating the rights of innocent third parties, who
also fall under surveillance in the process. On several
occasions, unauthorized access to databases to obtain
negative information on certain individuals- such as
political candidates, by individual police officers
during election campaigns have been reported in the
state of Victoria. In August 2005, a female resident
of Victoria had reported to the Ombudsman of being
threatened by a local female police officer in her
town that the police officer would access information
on her husband from the police database in order to
discredit him. The woman requested that her and her
husband’s files be checked to see if any unauthorized
access to their files had been made. After checking
the database for the information requested, the Office
of Police Integrity had sent her two folders of confid-
ential police files detailing that her husband’s file
had been accessed in April 2004 generating 10 pages
of computer print outs. However, in the same pack-
age they had inadvertently included details of 450
other individuals including details of criminal offend-
ers and victims. This matter is currently under invest-
igation (Austin, 2005). These indicate the current
level of poor security related to police databases and
their abuses and misuses.
Conclusion
There appear to be some differences between the
themes and categories of responses given by respond-
ents in the two countries, which may be due to their
different cultural, social and political systems and
realities, which need further study. The use of con-
venient samples for the survey also limits the gener-
alisability of the findings. However, this preliminary
survey serves as a pilot study for further research on
the subject (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). Any further
research could include interviews with members of
the public who do, as well as who do not have exper-
ience with using biometric devices; vendors of the
technology; policy makers and government officials
in charge of implementing the technology and related
policies; privacy advocates; and technical specialists
of biometric technologies. These interviews can be
supplemented with focus groups with citizens to
garner their views on biometrics for comparison with
those of experts, vendors, policy makers, and law
enforcement and government officials.
Such a research design will be utilizing the
strategy of methodological triangulation (Baxter &
Babbie, 2004).
As for the case in Australia, specific regulations
are needed to safeguard individuals’ rights when
biometric devices are used in everyday situations.
They should be related to the storage of biometric
measures, design standards for measuring devices,
prohibitions related to the manufacture, import, in-
stallation and use of biometric devices, audits of
compliance of devices and ethical guidelines (Phil-
lips, 2004) to safeguard the rights of individuals and
protect the data gathered about and from individuals.
EPIC (2004) lists the areas that need to be addressed
in policy making as storage, vulnerability (of data),
confidence (acceptable error rate), authenticity (can
information be tampered with), linking (limits on
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private vs government use), and ubiquity (implica-
tions of having an electronic trail on individuals
when commonly used with other technologies of
surveillance).
The general public in Australia need to be edu-
cated about this ‘mixed blessing’ so that they will
expect the government and law enforcement author-
ities to be more accountable regarding the methods
and situations in which data are collected, stored and
disseminated and that civil liberties are not sacrificed
in the name of national security or administrative
efficiency.
As the Justification Model of Technology
(Hamelink, 1988) suggests, the implementation of a
new technology is a ‘social gamble’ as we do not
know everything about it, its capabilities or how it
may be used once adopted by society. E.g. No one
foresaw the Internet being used by underage kids to
download pornography. As the pluralist view sug-
gests, the technology may be neutral or even useful
per se but its implementation needs to be balanced
between the wishes of the implementers and the
rights of those who are affected by the implementa-
tion.
Some respondents had suggested the devices
should be used only in extremely sensitive situations
such as the military, defense, air travel etc and only
to supplement non-biometric methods. There should
also be checks and balances to secure these data from
abuses and only be allowed access by those who
need to do so under specific conditions. Even though
technological determinists may argue that technology
is its own driving force, one should not forget the
role of society and its power holders in deciding how
it is to be used and for what purposes (van der Ploeg,
2003). As biometric technologies are still new, we
also need to learn more about them before their
widespread application, currently based on their
perceived accuracy and infallibility, which should
be subjected to further examination.
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